Public reaction to the Christmas Day airstrikes has been shaped by a single recurring question: why Sokoto and not Borno? After all, Borno remains the historical heartland of Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgency. The answer lies in how terrorism has evolved—and how counter-terrorism must adapt.
The choice of Sokoto was not symbolic. It was strategic.
Terrorism Has Moved Westward
ISWAP is no longer a geographically static threat. In recent years, it has deliberately expanded into the North-West, exploiting the convergence of banditry, weak state presence, and vast forest corridors stretching across Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, and into the Sahel.
Sokoto represents an expansion frontier, not a legacy battlefield. From a strategic standpoint, emerging sanctuaries are more dangerous than established ones because they are less contested and more fluid.
Borno Is a Managed Theatre
Borno, despite its challenges, is a saturated counter-terrorism environment. It hosts continuous Nigerian air and ground operations, multinational coordination, and long-standing intelligence focus. Terrorist groups there are hardened, dispersed, and deeply familiar with counter-measures.
By contrast, Sokoto offers higher disruption value. Striking terrorists before infrastructure hardens is cheaper, cleaner, and more effective than fighting them after entrenchment.
Preventing a Sahel–Nigeria Terror Corridor
Sokoto’s proximity to Niger Republic places it within the wider Sahelian jihadist arc. From a global counter-terrorism perspective, allowing ISWAP to consolidate a western corridor linking Lake Chad to the Sahel would represent a strategic failure.
Early intervention in Sokoto is therefore an act of containment, designed to prevent Nigeria from becoming the connective tissue between Sahelian and coastal terror theatres.
Intelligence Windows Dictate Targets
Airstrikes follow intelligence opportunity, not sentiment. Leadership concentration, training camps, and logistics hubs do not appear on a schedule. When intelligence converges with confidence, action follows—regardless of location.
At the time of the Sokoto strikes, the intelligence picture was reportedly clearer and more actionable than in Borno’s highly adaptive environment.
Strategic Signaling
Beginning in Sokoto sends a clear message to terrorist networks: there are no safe zones of expansion. It tells them that new territories will be contested as aggressively as old ones.
This disrupts not just operations, but planning psychology.
The Cautionary Note
However, striking Sokoto first carries responsibility. If airstrikes are not followed by mop-up operations and stabilization, the message changes—from deterrence to abandonment.
Sokoto must not become another example of early warning ignored after early action.
Conclusion
The Sokoto airstrikes were not a deviation from strategy; they were a reflection of a changing threat map. But strategy is not validated by choice of target alone. It is validated by what follows.
Nigeria has announced its awareness.
It must now demonstrate its resolve—on the ground.
The author, Frank Odion Apokwu, DSC, LLB, FNIM, FSM, FIMC, CMC, is a Management Consultant, Public Affairs Analyst, Commentator, Democratic Reforms, and Inclusive Development Advocate. He writes from Asaba.
