Germany’s Contemporary Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Analysis of Identity, Norms, and Implications for Transatlantic Alliances
By Anthony C. NWOKOLOBIA
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences,
Dennis Osadebay University, Asaba, Delta State, Nigeria
Email: nwokolobiatoni@gyahoo.com
Ugo C. OKOLIE
Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Management Sciences,
Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria
Email: ugookolie3@gmail.com
Abstract
This study examined Germany’s contemporary foreign policy from a constructivist perspective, focusing on the influence of identity, norms and historical experiences and their implications for transatlantic alliances. The study adopted a qualitative research design and content analysis of relevant academic literature, official documents, policy statements and institutional reports. The data were analysed thematically using key constructivist concepts, including identity, historical memory, norms, role conception and social interaction. The findings revealed that Germany’s foreign policy continued to reflect its post-war identity, historical responsibility, commitment to multilateralism, European integration and culture of military restraint. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 challenged these established orientations and triggered the Zeitenwende, marking a significant shift in Germany’s foreign policy and security identity. The study found that Germany had become more willing to assume greater responsibility for European security, strengthen its defence capabilities and adopt a more active geopolitical role. These developments, however, did not represent a complete departure from established norms but rather their reinterpretation and adaptation to changing security realities. The study concluded that Germany’s contemporary foreign policy reflected both continuity and gradual transformation. It recommended, among others, that Germany should strengthen its contribution to European and transatlantic security by improving its defence capabilities, supporting NATO burden-sharing and deepening security cooperation with European allies and the United States.
Keywords: Germany foreign policy, constructivism, identity, norms, transatlantic alliances
Introduction
Germany’s contemporary foreign policy had undergone significant transformation in response to changes in the European and international security environment. During much of the post-Cold War period, Germany had pursued a foreign policy characterised by multilateralism, economic interdependence, diplomatic restraint, European integration, and reliance on international institutions. Its approach had been strongly influenced by the historical experiences of the Second World War, the division of Germany, and a political culture that emphasised peace, cooperation, and restraint in the use of military power. Consequently, Germany had generally exercised international influence through economic strength, diplomacy, European institutions, and alliance-based cooperation rather than military power (Maull, 2018; Szabo, 2017).
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had, however, challenged the foundations of this traditional approach and contributed to the emergence of the Zeitenwende, or “turning point,” in German foreign and defence policy. The development had encouraged Germany to reconsider its defence capabilities, relations with Russia, military commitments, and role within NATO and the European Union. Bunde (2025) had described the Zeitenwende as a foreign-policy identity crisis arising from the tension between Germany’s established culture of restraint and the demands of a changing security environment. Meyer (2025) had similarly demonstrated that changes in German foreign and defence policy could be understood through the interaction of major events, political agency, and established structures.
A constructivist perspective had provided an appropriate framework for examining these developments because it emphasised the importance of identity, norms, historical experiences, beliefs, and shared understandings in shaping state behaviour. From this perspective, Germany’s foreign-policy interests had not been determined solely by material capabilities but had also been socially constructed through its historical experiences and understanding of appropriate international conduct. National identity had therefore remained central to Germany’s external behaviour. Germany had traditionally portrayed itself as a responsible European power committed to democracy, peace, multilateralism, human rights, and international cooperation. Pimenova (2024) had highlighted the importance of national identity in understanding contemporary Germany, while Atak (2025) had demonstrated how historical memories had influenced European identity and Germany’s attachment to the European Union.
The war in Ukraine had created tensions between Germany’s established identity and growing expectations of strategic leadership. Germany had faced pressure to provide military assistance to Ukraine, strengthen European security, increase defence commitments, and contribute more actively to NATO’s deterrence. At the same time, concerns about escalation, Germany’s historical experience with militarism, and its traditional culture of restraint had continued to shape political and public debates. O’Neal (2024) had examined these tensions through Germany’s culture of restraint, while Heck (2024) had shown that the legitimacy of German weapons deliveries to Ukraine had remained contested within foreign-policy discourse.
Domestic political dynamics had also influenced Germany’s changing foreign-policy orientation. Differences among parties within the traffic light coalition had generated debates over Germany’s security responsibilities, relations with Russia, and appropriate international role. Mello (2025) had demonstrated the importance of party politics and national role contestation in Germany’s response to the Russian war against Ukraine. Bartenstein and Wessels (2024) had further shown that German leadership narratives had shifted from a predominantly federalist conception towards a more geopolitical understanding of leadership.
Germany’s changing foreign policy had also had important implications for its transatlantic relationships and wider international role. While the United States and NATO had remained central to Germany’s security framework, changing geopolitical conditions had increased expectations for Germany to assume greater responsibility for European security. At the same time, Germany’s growing engagement in the Indo-Pacific had reflected an expanding conception of its international responsibilities. Wunderlich and Luo (2024) had examined Germany’s emergence as a middle power in the Indo-Pacific, while Ulatowski (2022) had highlighted its efforts to support the liberal international order and regional security. These developments had reinforced the broader transformation of Germany from a predominantly civilian and economically oriented power towards a more strategically conscious actor (Szabo, 2017).
The changing role of Germany had also raised questions about European leadership. Its economic strength and institutional position within the European Union had provided considerable capacity for leadership, although historical concerns about German dominance had traditionally encouraged caution. Bartenstein and Wessels (2024) had demonstrated the evolution of German leadership narratives, while Çelikaslan (2024) had identified Germany as an important actor in the emerging European security architecture. Against this background, the study examined Germany’s contemporary foreign policy through a constructivist lens, focusing on identity, norms, and their implications for transatlantic alliances.
Review of Related Literature
Germany’s Contemporary Foreign Policy
Germany’s contemporary foreign policy reflects a gradual transformation in its international role. Since the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy has largely been characterised by multilateralism, European integration, economic interdependence, diplomatic restraint and preference for civilian instruments of influence. This orientation has often been described in terms of Germany’s civilian power tradition, in which diplomacy, economic resources, international institutions and cooperation are preferred to unilateral military action (Maull, 2018; Szabo, 2017). This foreign-policy orientation was strongly influenced by Germany’s historical experience, particularly the consequences of the Second World War, the division of the country and its subsequent reunification. These experiences contributed to an international identity that emphasised restraint, European integration, reconciliation and opposition to the unilateral use of force.
However, Germany’s traditional foreign-policy orientation has increasingly been challenged by changes in the international security environment. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 constituted a major turning point. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s declaration of a Zeitenwende, or historic turning point, indicated Germany’s recognition that the changing European security environment required significant adjustments to defence policy, military capabilities, energy relations and its approach to Russia. O’Neal (2024) argues that the Zeitenwende must be understood against Germany’s established culture of restraint, which continued to influence debates over military power and international security. Consequently, although Germany became more willing to assume security responsibilities, the transformation remained gradual and contested.
Bunde (2025) interprets the Zeitenwende as a foreign-policy identity crisis rather than merely a change in defence expenditure or strategic policy. The central challenge was how Germany could respond to a more threatening international environment while preserving an identity associated with peace, restraint, European integration and economic cooperation. Löfflmann and Riemann (2025) similarly argue that the Zeitenwende generated temporal and ontological disruption in German foreign-policy narratives. Russia’s invasion challenged established assumptions about Germany’s relationship with Russia and the European security order, requiring German policymakers to reconsider both past policy choices and the country’s future international role.
Meyer (2025) provides a further explanation of continuity and change through an event-agency-structure framework. The study demonstrates that major international events can create opportunities for foreign-policy change, but such change remains influenced by political actors, institutional structures and established policy practices. Germany’s response to the war in Ukraine can therefore not be explained solely by the external security threat. Domestic political competition, institutional constraints and inherited foreign-policy traditions also affected the direction and pace of change.
Another important feature of Germany’s contemporary foreign policy is the growing debate over international and European leadership. Bartenstein and Wessels (2024) identify a shift from a federalist leadership narrative towards a more geopolitical leadership narrative. This suggests that Germany’s conception of its European role has gradually moved from primarily supporting institutional integration towards accepting greater responsibility for European security and geopolitical affairs. Çelikaslan (2024) similarly identifies Germany as an increasingly important actor in the emerging European security architecture. These developments suggest a gradual movement from Germany’s traditional image as primarily an economic and civilian power towards a more active strategic and security role.
Nevertheless, Germany’s changing foreign policy does not represent a complete abandonment of its traditional identity. Maull (2018) argues that German power remains difficult to categorise because it combines civilian, economic, hegemonic and geoeconomic dimensions. Germany continues to derive considerable international influence from its economic strength, diplomatic capacity, European institutional position and commitment to multilateralism. Szabo (2017) likewise describes Germany’s evolution from civilian power towards geoeconomic shaping power, highlighting the continuing importance of economic instruments in German international influence. Contemporary German foreign policy can therefore be understood as a combination of established civilian-power practices and emerging geopolitical responsibilities.
Constructivism, Identity and Foreign Policy
Constructivism provides an appropriate framework for examining Germany’s changing foreign policy because it focuses on the social construction of international politics. Unlike approaches that explain foreign policy primarily through material capabilities or strategic interests, constructivism emphasises the importance of identities, norms, values, historical memories and socially constructed understandings of appropriate behaviour. From this perspective, states do not simply respond to external conditions; they interpret those conditions through historically developed identities and normative frameworks. This is particularly relevant to Germany, where foreign-policy behaviour has been strongly influenced by historical experience and changing perceptions of the country’s appropriate international role.
Pimenova (2024) highlights the continuing importance of national identity in contemporary Germany and its relationship with the country’s international position. Germany’s historical experience has created a complex relationship between national identity and international responsibility. On the one hand, Germany seeks to exercise greater influence as a major European and global actor; on the other, it continues to emphasise democratic values, multilateralism, European integration and historical responsibility. This tension helps explain why changes in German foreign policy frequently generate debates over what Germany should represent internationally.
Atak (2025) provides further support for a constructivist understanding by examining the role of collective memory in Germany’s attachment to the European Union. The study demonstrates how interpretations of historical experiences can influence contemporary European identity. Germany’s commitment to European integration therefore cannot be explained solely by economic interests. European integration has also been associated with reconciliation, cooperation and the construction of a post-war German identity. From a constructivist perspective, these historically embedded meanings influence how German policymakers understand international events and determine what forms of foreign-policy behaviour are considered appropriate.
Germany’s culture of restraint represents another important normative dimension. O’Neal (2024) demonstrates that Germany’s response to the Zeitenwende remained influenced by established norms of military restraint. The debate surrounding military assistance to Ukraine further illustrates the significance of norms and identity. Heck (2024) examines the contested legitimacy of weapons deliveries to Ukraine and shows that German foreign-policy discourse involved competing understandings of legitimate and appropriate action. The debate was therefore not simply about whether military assistance would advance German security interests; it also involved questions of historical responsibility, morality, identity and the appropriate use of military force.
Bunde (2025) similarly demonstrates that the Zeitenwende created tension between Germany’s established identity and the demands of a more conflictual international environment. This suggests that foreign-policy transformation occurs when established identities and norms are challenged by changing circumstances. Policy change therefore involves not only the adjustment of interests but also the reconstruction and reinterpretation of the state’s international identity.
Germany and the European Union
The European Union remains central to Germany’s foreign-policy identity. Germany’s post-war international role has been closely associated with European integration, multilateralism and institutional cooperation. Atak (2025) shows that Germany’s attachment to the European Union is reinforced by historical narratives and collective memory, while Bartenstein and Wessels (2024) demonstrate that Germany’s understanding of European leadership has evolved in response to changing geopolitical circumstances.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has strengthened the importance of Germany’s role in European security. Çelikaslan (2024) argues that Germany has increasingly assumed responsibility for shaping the emerging European security architecture. This represents a movement from a relatively cautious approach to a more active conception of European leadership. Nevertheless, Germany’s emerging leadership remains influenced by its historical identity and preference for multilateral European decision-making.
The Weimar Triangle, involving Germany, France and Poland, has also gained renewed significance within European security discussions. Herring (2025) argues that Germany’s new government has an opportunity to reinvigorate the arrangement as an important framework for European security cooperation. The development illustrates Germany’s increasing willingness to strengthen European strategic capacity while maintaining its broader commitment to transatlantic security cooperation.
Germany’s European role is also connected to energy and environmental policy. Gattringer (2025) highlights Germany’s changing position on nuclear power at the European Union level, demonstrating the interaction between domestic political preferences and broader European strategic considerations. Such developments are relevant to constructivism because policy choices are influenced not only by material interests but also by domestic political identities, normative commitments and perceptions of appropriate national behaviour.
Germany, Russia and the Zeitenwende
Germany’s relationship with Russia provides one of the clearest illustrations of the transformation of German foreign policy. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany maintained extensive economic, political and diplomatic relations with Russia. This approach was partly based on the expectation that dialogue, economic interdependence and engagement could contribute to European stability. Russia’s invasion fundamentally challenged these assumptions and forced Germany to reconsider important elements of its foreign-policy approach.
Kostiuk (2025) identifies significant changes in German foreign policy resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian war. Germany became more willing to support Ukraine, strengthen European defence and reconsider its previous relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, the speed and extent of these changes were affected by domestic political disagreements and established foreign-policy traditions.
Mello (2025) further demonstrates that Germany’s response to the war was shaped by domestic party politics. The traffic light coalition consisted of parties with different ideological orientations and competing interpretations of Germany’s international role. Foreign-policy change was therefore also a product of domestic political contestation. From a constructivist perspective, these political debates were important because competing actors sought to define Germany’s responsibilities, interests and identity under changing international conditions.
The debate over weapons deliveries to Ukraine further illustrates the relationship between identity and foreign-policy behaviour. Heck (2024) shows that military assistance was subject to contested legitimacy in German foreign-policy discourse. Historical responsibility, traditions of restraint, concerns about escalation and commitments to European security produced competing interpretations of appropriate German behaviour. The decision to provide military support to Ukraine was therefore embedded in a broader debate over Germany’s changing international identity.
Germany and Transatlantic Alliances
Germany’s foreign-policy transformation has important implications for transatlantic relations, particularly its relationship with NATO and the United States. Germany’s post-war security identity developed within Western institutions, including NATO and the European integration project. Consequently, German security policy has historically been simultaneously European and transatlantic.
The changing European security environment has nevertheless generated renewed debates about the distribution of security responsibilities between Europe and the United States. Ilić and Milašinović (2025) examine transatlantic elites, German leadership and the future of European security, highlighting the growing importance of Germany in discussions about Europe’s strategic future. Greater German defence responsibility could contribute to burden-sharing within NATO and strengthen the European pillar of the alliance. At the same time, it raises questions about the relationship between European strategic autonomy and continued American involvement in European security.
Toettoe et al. (2024) provide an important public-opinion perspective through their analysis of identarian Atlanticism. Their study indicates that support for transatlantic cooperation is influenced not only by strategic interests but also by perceptions of shared identity and political belonging. This reinforces the constructivist argument that alliances can be sustained by shared norms, values and identities as well as by material security interests.
Germany’s increasing geopolitical role could therefore strengthen the transatlantic alliance rather than necessarily weaken it. A Germany that assumes greater responsibility for European defence could contribute to a stronger European pillar within NATO and reduce some of the security burden carried by the United States. However, tensions could arise if European strategic autonomy were interpreted as a project competing with American leadership. The relationship between European autonomy and transatlantic solidarity is therefore likely to remain an important feature of Germany’s foreign-policy debate.
Germany as a Middle and Global Power
Germany’s foreign-policy transformation extends beyond Europe. Ulatowski (2022) examines Germany’s growing engagement in the Indo-Pacific and argues that Berlin has sought to contribute to the preservation of the liberal international order and regional security. This development demonstrates that German foreign policy increasingly extends beyond its immediate European environment.
Wunderlich and Luo (2024) similarly conceptualise Germany as an emerging middle power in the Indo-Pacific. Germany’s regional engagement combines economic interests, multilateral cooperation and increasing attention to security issues. This represents an expansion of Germany’s international role from that of a primarily European economic power towards a state with broader global responsibilities.
Germany’s middle-power orientation is particularly relevant from a constructivist perspective because its international engagement continues to be presented through commitments to multilateralism, rules-based international order and institutional cooperation. Rather than pursuing traditional great-power dominance, Germany has generally sought influence through diplomacy, partnerships, economic relations and international institutions. This pattern demonstrates the continuing influence of Germany’s socially constructed identity on its international behaviour.
Steinmeier (2016) had earlier argued that Germany was moving towards a new global role requiring Berlin to assume greater international responsibility. Subsequent developments in European security, the Ukraine war and the Indo-Pacific indicate that this trajectory has continued, although Germany’s understanding of international responsibility has increasingly incorporated security and geopolitical considerations.
Germany’s Geoeconomic and Civilian Power
Germany’s economic strength remains a major source of its international influence. Maull (2018) argues that German power cannot be adequately described through a single category because it combines civilian, economic and geopolitical dimensions. Similarly, Szabo (2017) identifies Germany’s movement towards geoeconomic shaping power, highlighting the importance of economic resources in its foreign-policy influence. These arguments remain relevant because Germany continues to rely substantially on trade, investment, economic diplomacy and European institutions.
However, the war in Ukraine exposed important limitations in an approach based heavily on economic interdependence. Germany’s extensive economic relationship with Russia did not produce the expected political moderation and instead created strategic vulnerabilities. The resulting experience encouraged greater attention to economic security, energy diversification, strategic resilience and defence capabilities.
This development has created an important tension within Germany’s foreign-policy identity. Germany continues to value economic cooperation, multilateral institutions and civilian instruments of influence. At the same time, the contemporary security environment requires greater attention to military capabilities, geopolitical competition and strategic resilience. Germany’s current foreign policy therefore represents neither a complete continuation of its traditional model nor its complete abandonment. Rather, it reflects an ongoing interaction between established norms and emerging strategic requirements.
Theoretical Framework
This study is anchored on Constructivist Theory, particularly the constructivist perspective advanced by Wendt (1999). The theory is appropriate because it explains foreign-policy behaviour in terms of identity, norms, values, historical experiences and shared understandings, rather than focusing solely on material capabilities and strategic interests. Constructivism holds that states’ interests and foreign-policy preferences are socially constructed through interaction and that states act according to how they understand themselves and the roles they consider appropriate within the international system (Wendt, 1999).
In the German context, constructivism provides a useful basis for understanding how historical experiences, particularly the Second World War, the division and reunification of Germany, and the process of European integration, shaped the country’s post-war foreign-policy identity. These experiences contributed to the development of norms emphasising military restraint, multilateralism, European cooperation and historical responsibility. Germany’s traditional position as a civilian and economically influential power can therefore be understood not only through its material capabilities but also through the identities and norms that emerged from its historical experiences (Maull, 2018; Szabo, 2017).
The theory is particularly relevant to understanding the Zeitenwende that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Bunde (2025) describes the Zeitenwende as a foreign-policy identity crisis because Germany was compelled to reconcile its established culture of restraint and engagement with the demands of a fundamentally changed European security environment. The war challenged Germany’s previous assumptions about Russia, European security and the appropriate role of military power, thereby creating pressure for a reassessment of its foreign-policy identity. Similarly, Löfflmann and Riemann (2025) argue that the Zeitenwende disrupted established temporal and security narratives, encouraging Germany to reconsider its historical experiences and future international role.
Constructivism also highlights the importance of norms in shaping Germany’s foreign-policy decisions. Norms establish expectations about appropriate state behaviour, and Germany’s long-standing commitment to military restraint, multilateralism, European integration and international cooperation has influenced its external conduct. The debate surrounding weapons deliveries to Ukraine illustrates this process. Heck (2024) demonstrates that German support for Ukraine was accompanied by competing interpretations of legitimacy and appropriateness, reflecting the tension between Germany’s traditional culture of restraint and its emerging security responsibilities. From a constructivist perspective, such debates are significant because foreign-policy choices are influenced not only by calculations of national interest but also by perceptions of what constitutes legitimate and appropriate behaviour.
The constructivist framework further helps to explain Germany’s changing position within the European Union and transatlantic alliances. Germany’s commitment to European integration and NATO is closely associated with its identity as a European and Western state. However, the changing security environment has encouraged Germany to assume greater responsibility for European defence and security. Bartenstein and Wessels (2024) identify a movement towards a more geopolitical conception of German leadership, while Çelikaslan (2024) highlights Germany’s increasing significance in the emerging European security architecture. These developments indicate an evolution in Germany’s international role from one primarily associated with civilian power and restraint towards one involving greater geopolitical and security responsibility.
The theory is therefore useful for explaining both continuity and change in Germany’s contemporary foreign policy. Constructivism recognises that established identities and norms can persist over time while also allowing for their transformation when significant events challenge existing understandings. Meyer (2025) similarly shows that Germany’s foreign-policy adaptation following the Zeitenwende resulted from the interaction of external events, political actors and existing institutional structures. Consequently, Germany’s contemporary foreign policy cannot be explained solely by changes in material power or external threats; it must also be understood in terms of changing perceptions of Germany’s identity, responsibilities and appropriate international behaviour.
For this study, the principal constructivist concepts are identity, norms, historical memory, social interaction and role conception. Identity refers to Germany’s understanding of itself as a civilian power, a European power and an increasingly responsible geopolitical actor. Norms refer to principles such as military restraint, multilateralism, democratic values and European cooperation. Historical memory captures the influence of Germany’s past on contemporary foreign-policy choices, particularly the lessons derived from the Second World War and Germany’s post-war development. Social interaction refers to Germany’s relationships with the European Union, NATO, the United States, Russia and other international actors, through which its interests, expectations and roles are continuously shaped and negotiated.
The Constructivist Theory consequently provides the analytical foundation for examining how Germany’s changing identity and normative commitments have influenced its contemporary foreign policy and how these changes have affected its relations with transatlantic alliances. The central assumption of the framework is that Germany’s increasing willingness to undertake greater security and geopolitical responsibilities represents not merely a response to external threats but also an ongoing process of identity reconstruction and normative adaptation. The theory therefore enables the study to examine how Germany’s historical identity, changing norms and evolving conception of its international role have shaped its foreign-policy behaviour in the contemporary international system.
Relevance of the Theory to the Study
The Constructivist Theory is particularly relevant to this study for four main reasons. First, it explains how Germany’s historical experiences have shaped its foreign-policy identity, including the influence of the Second World War, post-war reconstruction, reunification and European integration. Second, it provides a framework for examining how norms such as military restraint, multilateralism, European cooperation and historical responsibility have influenced Germany’s foreign-policy decisions. Third, the theory provides an appropriate basis for understanding the Zeitenwende as a process of identity and normative transformation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Finally, it helps to assess the implications of Germany’s changing identity and role for NATO, the United States and broader transatlantic relations.
The theory enables the study to move beyond a purely material explanation of contemporary German foreign policy. Germany’s increasing defence commitments, greater European leadership and expanding role in transatlantic security cannot be explained solely by changes in military threats, power relations or national interests. They must also be understood in terms of changing perceptions of Germany’s identity, responsibilities and appropriate role in international affairs. From a constructivist perspective, the transformation of German foreign policy reflects an ongoing process in which historical identities and established norms are being reassessed in response to changes in the international security environment.
The relevance of this approach is reinforced by recent scholarship. Bunde (2025) specifically interprets the German Zeitenwende as a foreign-policy identity crisis, demonstrating how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine challenged established understandings of Germany’s international role and compelled a reassessment of its security responsibilities. Thus, Constructivist Theory provides a strong analytical foundation for examining how Germany’s evolving identity and normative commitments have influenced its contemporary foreign policy and its relationship with transatlantic alliances.
Synthesis of the Literature and Identified Gap
The reviewed literature demonstrates that Germany’s contemporary foreign policy is characterised by both continuity and change. Maull (2018) and Szabo (2017) establish the importance of Germany’s civilian and geoeconomic power, while Pimenova (2024) and Atak (2025) demonstrate the significance of national identity and historical memory. Bartenstein and Wessels (2024) examine Germany’s changing leadership narrative, while Bunde (2025), O’Neal (2024), Heck (2024), Löfflmann and Riemann (2025), and Meyer (2025) examine the Zeitenwende, foreign-policy adaptation and the tension between established norms and changing security conditions. Ulatowski (2022) and Wunderlich and Luo (2024) extend the discussion to Germany’s emerging global and Indo-Pacific role.
The literature further demonstrates that Germany’s changing role is closely connected to European and transatlantic security. Çelikaslan (2024) examines Germany’s emerging leadership in European security, while Ilić and Milašinović (2025) focus on German leadership and the future of European security. Toettoe et al. (2024) add the important dimension of identity and public attitudes towards transatlantic relations, while Mello (2025) demonstrates the influence of domestic party politics on Germany’s response to the Ukraine war.
Despite these important contributions, the literature reveals a gap in the integrated constructivist analysis of Germany’s contemporary foreign policy. Existing studies have largely examined individual dimensions, including the Zeitenwende, historical memory, military restraint, German leadership, party politics, European security, transatlantic relations and the Indo-Pacific. However, relatively limited attention has been given to how identity, norms, historical memory, leadership narratives and transatlantic commitments interact to shape Germany’s contemporary foreign-policy behaviour.
This study addresses this gap by applying a constructivist perspective to Germany’s contemporary foreign policy. It examines how Germany’s evolving identity and normative commitments influence its responses to changing international circumstances and how these changes affect its role in transatlantic alliances. The study consequently moves beyond an explanation based solely on material capabilities and strategic interests to examine how Germany understands who it is, what responsibilities it has, and what constitutes appropriate behaviour in international politics.
This approach matters because changes in military capabilities or external threats alone cannot fully explain Germany’s foreign-policy transformation. Its response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its changing attitude towards military power, its emerging European leadership role and its continuing commitment to transatlantic cooperation are also shaped by competing understandings of German identity and responsibility. A constructivist analysis therefore provides a useful basis for explaining both the persistence of Germany’s traditional foreign-policy practices and the emergence of new geopolitical behaviour.
Research Methods
This study adopted a qualitative research design based on documentary analysis and qualitative content analysis. The design was appropriate because the study examined Germany’s contemporary foreign policy through the interpretation of policy documents, scholarly literature, official statements, speeches, strategic documents and other relevant textual materials. Rather than measuring foreign-policy behaviour quantitatively, the study focused on understanding the meanings, ideas, norms, identities and interpretations underlying Germany’s foreign-policy decisions.
The qualitative approach was particularly suitable for examining Germany’s foreign policy within its historical, political and international contexts. It enabled the study to explore how historical experiences, foreign-policy identity and normative commitments have shaped Germany’s changing international role. It also provided an appropriate basis for examining the Zeitenwende and its implications for Germany’s relations with the European Union, NATO, the United States and broader transatlantic alliances.
Sources of Data
The study relied exclusively on secondary data obtained from academic books, peer-reviewed journal articles, government and institutional documents, foreign-policy and defence strategies, official speeches and statements, reports of international organisations, and publications from reputable policy and research institutions. Particular attention was given to materials addressing Germany’s foreign-policy identity, European integration, military restraint, transatlantic relations, NATO, European security, the Russia-Ukraine war and the Zeitenwende.
The selection of documents was guided by their relevance to the research objectives and their capacity to provide evidence on Germany’s identity, norms, historical memory and changing international role. Recent publications, particularly those addressing developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, were prioritised. Foundational theoretical and historical works were also included where necessary to provide conceptual and contextual depth.
Method of Data Analysis
The study employed content analysis as its principal method of data analysis. Content analysis involves the systematic examination and interpretation of textual materials through the identification, organisation and interpretation of relevant categories and themes. Schreier (2012) emphasises the importance of developing a systematic coding frame, segmenting the material, applying the coding categories consistently and interpreting the patterns that emerge. This approach was appropriate for reducing and organising extensive documentary materials while retaining their meanings and contextual significance.
Results and Discussion
The content analysis of the selected materials produced five major themes concerning Germany’s contemporary foreign policy: the persistence of historical identity and strategic restraint; the transformation of Germany’s security identity following the Zeitenwende; the continuing influence and contestation of foreign-policy norms; Germany’s emerging European and geopolitical role; and the implications of these developments for transatlantic relations. Overall, the findings revealed a pattern of continuity and gradual transformation rather than a complete departure from Germany’s post-war foreign-policy tradition.
1 Historical Identity and Strategic Restraint
The analysis showed that Germany’s contemporary foreign policy remained significantly influenced by its historical experiences. The Second World War, the division and reunification of Germany, and the subsequent process of European integration contributed to a foreign-policy identity associated with strategic restraint, multilateralism, economic cooperation and a cautious approach to the use of military power. Germany’s post-war foreign-policy orientation was therefore shaped not only by its material capabilities but also by historically constructed understandings of the role it should play in international affairs.
The documentary evidence indicated that Germany traditionally relied on diplomacy, economic engagement, European cooperation and multilateral institutions as important instruments of international influence. Maull (2018) described Germany as a distinctive form of power whose influence had historically been exercised through civilian, economic and institutional means, while Szabo (2017) highlighted its development from civilian power towards geoeconomic influence.
The finding therefore indicated considerable continuity in Germany’s foreign-policy identity. Despite possessing substantial economic and political capabilities, Germany continued to operate within a normative environment shaped by historical responsibility, restraint and preference for multilateral solutions.
2 The Zeitenwende and the Transformation of Germany’s Security Identity
A major finding was that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 significantly challenged Germany’s established foreign-policy identity. The Zeitenwende represented more than a change in defence policy; it initiated a broader reassessment of Germany’s understanding of security, military responsibility and its international role.
The analysis showed that the war challenged Germany’s previous assumptions concerning Russia, economic interdependence and European security. Germany was increasingly confronted with the need to reconcile its traditional reluctance towards military power with the demands of supporting Ukraine and strengthening European defence. Bunde (2025) therefore interpreted the Zeitenwende as a foreign-policy identity crisis, while Löfflmann and Riemann (2025) demonstrated that it disrupted established temporal and security narratives.
The findings consequently suggested that the Zeitenwende represented a significant process of identity reconstruction. Germany was compelled to reconsider not only its immediate security policies but also its understanding of its historical experience, responsibilities and future international role.
3 Norms, Legitimacy and Foreign-Policy Decision-Making
The analysis further revealed that norms remained central to German foreign-policy decision-making, even as their meaning and application became increasingly contested. Germany’s growing defence commitments and support for Ukraine were accompanied by debates concerning legitimacy, appropriateness and historical responsibility.
The debate surrounding weapons deliveries to Ukraine provided a clear illustration of this tension. Germany had to reconcile its established norm of military restraint with growing expectations that it should contribute actively to European security. Heck (2024) found that German foreign-policy discourse concerning weapons deliveries reflected competing understandings of legitimate and appropriate action.
The finding therefore indicated that Germany did not simply abandon its traditional norms following the Zeitenwende. Instead, existing norms were reinterpreted and adapted to changing circumstances. Military restraint continued to influence policy, but it increasingly coexisted with norms of solidarity, collective defence, support for Ukraine and greater responsibility for European security.
4 Germany’s Emerging European and Geopolitical Role
The analysis revealed a gradual expansion of Germany’s role in European security and international affairs. Its traditional identity as a civilian and economic power was increasingly complemented by expectations that it should assume greater political, strategic and defence responsibilities.
Bartenstein and Wessels (2024) identified a movement from a predominantly federalist conception of German leadership towards a more geopolitical leadership narrative. Similarly, Çelikaslan (2024) highlighted Germany’s growing significance in the emerging European security architecture.
The findings suggested that Germany was redefining what it meant to be a responsible European power. This did not amount to a complete abandonment of its traditional identity. Rather, Germany continued to support European cooperation and multilateral institutions while accepting greater responsibility for European defence and security. Its emerging geopolitical role therefore reflected both continuity and adaptation.
5 Germany and Transatlantic Alliances
The analysis demonstrated that Germany’s evolving foreign-policy identity had significant implications for NATO, the United States and broader transatlantic relations. Germany remained committed to the transatlantic security framework, but its role within that framework was becoming more active.
The changing European security environment increased expectations that Germany should contribute more substantially to collective defence and European security. Its stronger defence commitments and greater willingness to assume strategic responsibilities suggested a movement towards greater burden-sharing within the transatlantic alliance.
The findings did not indicate a fundamental departure from NATO or the United States. Instead, Germany’s changing approach suggested an effort to strengthen the European contribution to transatlantic security. Germany’s evolving role could therefore reinforce transatlantic cooperation by making it a more capable and responsible security partner.
Discussion of Findings
The finding that Germany’s historical experiences continued to shape its foreign-policy behaviour supports the central proposition of Constructivist Theory that state interests and actions are influenced by socially constructed identities and historical experiences. Germany’s cautious approach to military power cannot be explained adequately by material interests alone; it also reflects a historically constructed understanding of appropriate international behaviour.
This finding agrees with Maull (2018) and Szabo (2017), who emphasised Germany’s distinctive civilian and geoeconomic forms of power. It also demonstrates that Germany’s foreign policy developed within a normative environment shaped by the historical consequences of German militarism and its subsequent integration into European and Western institutions. From a constructivist perspective, Germany’s history therefore continued to provide meaning and boundaries for foreign-policy behaviour. Historical memory influenced how political actors interpreted security challenges and determined what responses were considered legitimate and appropriate.
Also, the finding that the Zeitenwende constituted a transformation of Germany’s foreign-policy identity strongly supports Bunde’s (2025) argument that Germany experienced a foreign-policy identity crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The war created a tension between Germany’s established identity as a restrained civilian power and the growing expectation that it should assume greater military and strategic responsibility.
The finding also corroborates Löfflmann and Riemann (2025), who demonstrated that the Zeitenwende disrupted established security narratives. Germany was compelled to reconsider the assumptions underlying its previous approach to Russia, economic interdependence and European security. The constructivist interpretation is particularly useful because it explains the debate and hesitation that accompanied Germany’s policy response. Foreign-policy change was not simply a mechanical reaction to an external threat. It involved contestation over identity, norms, historical responsibility, and the legitimacy of particular policy choices.
Moreover, the finding that traditional norms remained influential while becoming increasingly contested supports the constructivist proposition that norms shape perceptions of appropriate state behaviour. Germany’s response to the war in Ukraine demonstrated that established norms do not necessarily disappear when circumstances change. Instead, they may be reinterpreted, contested and adapted.
This finding corroborates Heck’s (2024) analysis of the contested legitimacy of German weapons deliveries to Ukraine. The debate reflected tension between Germany’s traditional norm of military restraint and the emerging expectation of collective responsibility for European security. The implication is that Germany’s transformation should not be interpreted as a straightforward abandonment of restraint. Rather, Germany was developing a broader conception of responsible international behaviour in which military capabilities could, under specific circumstances, be employed to support partners, defend European security and uphold democratic values.
The study further revealed that Germany was assuming greater responsibility for European security is consistent with Bartenstein and Wessels (2024) and Çelikaslan (2024). Germany’s increased involvement in European security suggested a broader conception of leadership in which economic influence was increasingly complemented by political and strategic responsibility.
From a constructivist perspective, this development represents a change in Germany’s role conception. Germany was increasingly expected to view itself not only as a supporter of European integration but also as a major actor with responsibilities for maintaining the European security order. The finding therefore suggests that Germany’s geopolitical evolution should not be understood solely as an attempt to maximise national power. It also reflects changing expectations among German political actors and European partners concerning the responsibilities associated with Germany’s position within Europe.
Finally, the finding that Germany’s evolving identity could strengthen transatlantic cooperation is significant. Rather than indicating a rejection of NATO or the United States, Germany’s increased security responsibilities suggest a movement towards greater burden-sharing within the alliance.
Germany’s stronger defence role could make it a more capable transatlantic partner while simultaneously increasing Europe’s capacity to contribute to collective security. This development is particularly significant within the post-2022 European security environment, where greater European responsibility has become increasingly important. From a constructivist perspective, Germany’s continued commitment to NATO and the transatlantic community also reflects the persistence of its Western identity. Its increasing security responsibilities can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to redefine its appropriate role within the transatlantic order rather than as a rejection of that order.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This study examined Germany’s contemporary foreign policy through a constructivist perspective, focusing on the influence of identity, norms and historical experiences and their implications for transatlantic alliances. The findings showed that Germany’s foreign policy remained strongly shaped by its post-war identity, historical responsibility, commitment to multilateralism, European integration and culture of military restraint. However, the changing international security environment, particularly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, challenged some of these established orientations and encouraged a reassessment of Germany’s foreign and security policy.
The study further found that the Zeitenwende represented a significant transformation in Germany’s foreign-policy and security identity. Germany had become more willing to assume greater responsibility for European security, strengthen its defence capabilities and play a more active geopolitical role. This development, however, did not constitute a complete departure from its established foreign-policy norms. Rather, existing norms of restraint, multilateralism and historical responsibility were being reinterpreted and adapted to emerging security realities. The findings also indicated that Germany’s evolving role could contribute to stronger transatlantic relations through greater burden-sharing and increased European contributions to NATO, while maintaining cooperation with the United States and other Western allies.
In conclusion, Germany’s contemporary foreign policy was characterised by a combination of continuity and gradual transformation. The Zeitenwende accelerated Germany’s adaptation to a more challenging international environment, but its foreign-policy behaviour remained embedded in historically constructed identities, norms and shared understandings. From a constructivist perspective, Germany’s changing international role was therefore not merely a response to material security threats. It also reflected an ongoing process of redefining Germany’s responsibilities as a European and transatlantic power. Based on the findings and conclusion of the study, the following recommendations are made:
Germany should strengthen its contribution to European and transatlantic security by improving its defence capabilities, supporting NATO burden-sharing and deepening security cooperation with European allies and the United States.
Germany should balance its expanding geopolitical role with its established norms of restraint, multilateralism and historical responsibility. Its increased security engagement should remain consistent with international law, democratic values and the principles of European cooperation.
Germany should promote broader domestic political and public consensus on the Zeitenwende. Greater parliamentary and public engagement should be encouraged to ensure that its evolving foreign and security policy remains coherent, legitimate and sustainable.
Contribution to Knowledge
The study made the following contributions to knowledge:
The study affirmed the need for a constructivist understanding of Germany’s contemporary foreign policy by demonstrating that foreign-policy behaviour was shaped not only by material interests and security threats but also by identity, historical experiences, norms and shared understandings.
It established the need for greater attention to historical identity in explaining Germany’s foreign-policy choices. It demonstrated that Germany’s post-war experiences, historical responsibility and culture of restraint continued to influence its approach to security, military engagement and international cooperation.
It also reaffirmed the need to understand the Zeitenwende as an identity and normative transformation rather than merely a military or defence-policy adjustment. It showed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted a broader reassessment of Germany’s international role and security responsibilities.
It further reaffirmed the relevance of Constructivist Theory for explaining continuity and change in contemporary foreign policy. It demonstrated that major international events could challenge established identities and norms while creating opportunities for their adaptation and reconstruction.
Suggestions for Further Studies
Based on the scope and findings of the study, the following areas are suggested for further research:
Further studies should examine the long-term implications of the Zeitenwende for Germany’s defence policy and its contribution to NATO, particularly as Germany continues to redefine its security responsibilities.
Future studies should compare Germany’s evolving foreign-policy identity with those of other major European powers, such as France, Poland and the United Kingdom, to determine how different historical experiences and national identities shape responses to contemporary security challenges.
Further research should investigate the influence of domestic political parties, public opinion and parliamentary debates on Germany’s changing foreign-policy norms, particularly regarding military assistance to Ukraine and increased defence spending.
Future studies should examine the implications of Germany’s evolving geopolitical role for the future of transatlantic relations, with particular attention to Germany–United States relations, NATO burden-sharing and the development of European strategic autonomy.
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